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STATEMENT OF PARTIES
As explained in detail in this Brief, this appeal is taken
from one of three cases which were consolidated in the district
court. Not all parties to the litigation appear in the caption of
this appeal. In compliance with Rule 24(a)(1), the following list
of additional parties from all three cases which do not appear in
the caption is submitted: Rockwood Insurance Company; Arizona AllClaims,

Inc.; Utah All-Claims, Inc.; Ray

Scurlock.

Summers; and Paul
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court had original appellate jurisdiction
under §78-2-2(3)(j).

The Supreme Court exercised its authority

under §78-2-2(4) to transfer this case to the Utah Court of Appeals
in an Order to that effect, dated February 20, 1992.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The following issues are presented for appellate review:
1.

Did the district court err by ruling that a general

release, dated July 12, 1985, executed by the plaintiff and later
affirmed by him, did not release the defendant known as The Putter
Club?
This issue is a question of law for which this court may
substitute its judgment for that of the district court.

Henretty

v. Manti City Corp., 791 P.2d 506 (Utah 1990).
2.

Did the district court err in failing to find that this

action was barred by the one-action rule when children of the
deceased filed first another wrongful death action which was
settled?
This issue is one of law for which this court need not defer
to the trial court.
3.

HenrettyP

id.

Did the plaintiff waive the right to pursue a wrongful

death claim in this case when he elected to affirm the general
release he earlier executed and further chose to pursue a fraud
claim in a related case?

1

This issue is also a question of law for which this appellate
court may freely substitute its judgment for that of the district
court.
4.

Henretty,

id.

Did the district court err in refusing to allow The

Putter Club credit against the judgment in this case for all funds
received by the plaintiff as settlement of his related fraud
action?
This issue is also a question of law for which this appellate
court may substitute its judgment.
5.

Henretty,

id.

Did the district court err by refusing to allow The

Putter Club advise the jury at trial of the amount of settlement
received by all heirs, including the plaintiff, in all related
actions because of the death of Marilyn Stalboerger?
This is a question of law for which this appellate court may
substitute its judgment.
6.

Henretty,

id.

Did the district court err in allowing punitive damages

to be considered and awarded by the jury against an employer
corporation for the acts of its employee?
This is a question of law for which the appellate court may
substitute its judgment.
7.

Assuming

Henretty.

the plaintiff

id.
can

establish

that punitive

damages are legally available under the circumstances established
by the evidence, was the evidence sufficient to sustain the large
award of punitive damages?

2

This is a question of fact for which this court should sustain
the jury verdict so long as there is ample evidence to support the
award.
8.

Penrod v. Carter. 737 P. 2d 199 (Utah 1987).
Were the remarks in the rebuttal portion of the closing

argument of plaintiff's counsel to the effect that the jury should
send the private club industry in Utah "a message" by the amount of
the damages they award constitute prejudicial, improper argument
which justifies a new trial?
This is a question of law for which the appellate court may
substitute its judgment.

Henretty,

id.

DETERMINATIVE LAW
Appellant claims that the following law bears directly upon
the issues presented and are reproduced in the Addendum to this
Brief:
§37-11-1, U.C.A. (1953)
§78-11-7, U.C.A (1953)
§78-27-42, U.C.A. (1953)
Please note: all of the foregoing statutes have been repealed
or amended since this accident.

The statutes reproduced in the

Addendum are those in effect at the time of the accident.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

NATURE OF THE CASE

This is an action against a dram shop by a surviving husband
for the wrongful death of his wife in an automobile accident.

3

II.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
A.

Introduction

This case is unusually complicated procedurally for a tort
case.

The complication arises out of the filing of three cases by

different heirs concerning facts of one automobile accident.

The

result is the involvement of three district judges, probably a
dozen legal counsel, multiple parties, and interrelated claims.
An understanding of the nature of each of the three lawsuits
is vital to resolution of the issues presented in this brief. What
follows is a statement of the course of proceedings for each of the
three cases. Addendum "A" contains a pictorial summary of each of
these cases.

Addendum "B" is a roster of names with a brief

statement of identity of each.
B.

Stalboerger v. Rockwood Ins. Co., et al.

On January 22, 1986, the first lawsuit, case #86-494, was
filed by John Stalboerger, husband of the decedent, against the
Rockwood Insurance Company, Redwood Industries, Inc., and Joe B.
Turpin. R., p. 1A. Rockwood Insurance Company was the insurer of
the alleged drunk driver in the automobile accident and, by coincidence, the insurer of the vehicle in which the deceased was riding.
R. , pp. 1A - 2. Redwood Industries, Inc., was the employer of the
defendant driver and owner of the vehicle driven at the time of the
accident.

Joe B. Turpin was the alleged

intoxicated driver

involved in the collision.
The Complaint is curious because it states six causes of
action against Rockwood Insurance Company and none against the
4

other two defendants. The general nature of the Complaint is that
agents of the insurance company induced the plaintiff by fraud to
enter a release and accept a payment for the death of his wife and
his own personal injury.
On February 12, 1988, Rockwood Insurance Company filed an
Amended Third Party Complaint which joined as defendants Arizona
All-Claims, Inc., d/b/a Utah All-Claims, Inc., and Ray Summers.
These corporations were alleged to be the independent adjusting
firm which actually handled the original settlement of the claim of
the plaintiff for the death of his wife and his own injuries. Ray
Summers was the employee of the adjusting firm that actually
conducted the transaction.

R., p. 212.

Pursuant to a Motion to Dismiss filed by Rockwood Insurance
Company, the Third District Court ordered the plaintiff elect to
either affirm the release which had been entered or to pursue
recision of the release on the basis of fraud and, if successful,
pursue claims for wrongful death.

R., pp. 333 - 340, 350, 354 -

356. The election to affirm the release was made by the plaintiff
by formal notice on September 30, 1988. R., p. 547 - 548.
The natural consequence of affirming the release was to allow
the persons named in the release, Redwood Industries, Inc., and Joe
B. Turpin be dismissed from the litigation pursuant to their Motion
for Summary Judgment. R. , pp. 585 - 586, 594 - 596. The result of
these motions as of May 30, 1989, was that Rockwood Insurance
Company was the only defendant left in the case with its third
party claim against the adjusting agent still in place.
5

On December

18, 1989, the court granted

leave for the

plaintiff to file an Amended Complaint, R. , p. 771. The amendment
added the third party defendants as principal defendants under
claims of bad faith insurance adjustment.

R., pp. 927 - 939.

On January 18, 1990, the court consolidated this case with
cases C-87-2830 and C-86-985, described below.
Without providing detail, a number of motions were filed by
the defendant and resulted in some claims being dismissed against
the insurer and the adjuster while others survived. In April 1990,
the third party claims of Rockwood Insurance Company against the
adjuster were dismissed.
In

a Motion

filed

R., pp. 1479 - 1480.
May

17, 1990, plaintiff

Stalboerger

represented to the court that a settlement agreement had been
reached with the Rockwood Insurance Company and Utah All-Claims and
actually presented a copy of the release to the court for review.
R. , pp. 1482 - 1491. This led to an Order of Dismissal in favor of
Rockwood and the adjusting firm.

R., pp. 1575 - 1579.

The effect of the last Order described above of the court was
to end the fraud case.
C.

Scurlock v. Turpin

Case number C-86-0985 was filed February 10, 1986.

This

action, brought by a son of the decedent, was for wrongful death
and named only the other driver in the accident, Joe Turpin, as a
defendant. R. , p. 2. [All citations to the record in this section
are to the paginated record of C-86-0985.]

6

An Amended Complaint was filed which expanded the plaintiffs
to include Mark Scurlock and Mary Buerkle, the other surviving
children of the decedent.

The Amended Complaint named The Putter

Club as a defendant. R., pp. 59 - 62. There is no order allowing
the Amended Complaint.
On July 1, 1988, the court entered an Order to Show Cause in
which it acknowledged that the plaintiffs in this action had
settled their claims.

R., pp. 143 - 146, in Addendum "G".

This

key Order also stated that it realized plaintiff Stalboerger had to
elect in a related case whether to proceed on his fraud claim by
affirming the release or whether to seek recision of the release
and move forward on the wrongful death claims. The court ordered
that this case would be dismissed effective July 18, 1988, unless
Stalboerger could show cause why the court should not dismiss the
case with prejudice.
In what can only be described as unusual at best, Stalboerger
filed a Motion for Clarification of Previous Order over a year
later on November 8, 1989. R., pp., 147 - 166. The procedure is
unusual because Stalboerger was not a named party to the litigation
yet was asking the court for specific rulings on the application of
the litigation to him.

While the resolution of this Motion was

pending, the case was consolidated.

An Order was entered on May

10, 1990, which held that the Order of July 6, 1988, was not a
final Order of Dismissal.

R. , pp. 198 - 201.

However, in a

Memorandum, filed May 22, 1989, Stalboerger took the position that

7

the Order to Show Cause " . . . actually was an Order of Dismissal.
. .".

R., #C87-2830, p. 137.

The procedural posture of this case defies rational description. All of the parties to the litigation had settled, the court
had entered an Order stating the case would be dismissed as of a
certain date and then stated that the lawsuit was not actually
dismissed in response to a motion brought by someone who was not a
party to the lawsuit.
D.

R., pp. 199 - 200.

Stalboerger v. The Putter Club

This case carried the district court number of C87-2830.
[Citations to the record in this part are to C87-2830.]
complaint was originally filed on April 27, 1987.

The

R., p. 2.

Defendants were the driver, Joe Turpin, his employer, Redwood
Industries, Inc., and The Putter Club.

The Complaint generally

claimed for the wrongful death of Marilyn Stalboerger with a claim
of dram shop liability against The Putter Club.
A review of the record shows that nothing of substance
occurred and that the case essentially was dormant. Turpin did not
appear through counsel until February 5, 1988.

R. , p. 50.

The

first appearance of The Putter Club was in July, 1988. R., p. 67.
As was shown in a motion much later, The Putter Club was never
served by the plaintiff and the co-defendant, Joe Turpin, was
actually the moving force behind getting The Putter Club into the
litigation.

R., p. 70 and R., C86-494, pp. 1736 - 1781.

An Amended

Complaint which added

distress was allowed on June 21, 1989.
8

a claim

for emotional

R., pp. 171 - 188.

Consolidation with the other cases described above was ordered on
December 21, 1989. R. , pp. 252 - 253.
Consolidation
Honorable

Michael

resulted
Murphy

in these

under

case

cases being
number

before the

C86-494.

Trial

commenced in his court on September 17, 1991 and concluded with a
jury verdict on September 20, 1991. R. C86-494, p. 1972. Judgment
was entered on September 30, 1992 in the amount of $487,000 plus
$100,000 of punitive damages.

Because of some credits awarded by

the court discussed in detail below, the net judgment was $551,900.
R. C86-949, pp. 1974 - 1975.

See, Addendum "Gfl.

The Putter Club made a timely Motion for New Trial, or in the
Alternative, for Remittitur on October 7, 1991.

R. C86-494, p.

1980. The Motion was denied on November 20, 1991. R. C86-494, p.
2063. A Notice of Appeal was filed on December 16, 1991. R., pp.
276 - 277.
III.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

All of the citations to the record in this part are to case
number C86-494 unless otherwise indicated.
On June 20, 1985, at about 350 South on Redwood Road in Salt
Lake City, John and Marilyn Stalboerger were riding in one vehicle
and Joe Turpin was driving another vehicle.

R. , p. la.

Turpin,

who was later determined to be intoxicated, crossed the center
median to collide with the Stalboergers.

Mrs. Stalboerger was

killed in the collision.
While vigorously contested at trial, plaintiff successfully
had a jury conclude that Mr. Turpin had become intoxicated while
9

consuming alcohol at The Putter Club, a private club located at the
time in Salt Lake City. See Amended Complaint, generally, in C872830, at R., p. 177, et

seq.

Turpin was operating a motor vehicle owned by his employer,
Redwood Industries.

R., p. 2.

It was later determined that both

Turpin and the Stalboergers were insured by the same insurance
company, Rockwood Insurance Company.

R., p. 2.

A few days after the accident, plaintiff was contacted by Ray
Summers, an insurance adjuster employed by Utah All-Claims, Inc.,
in behalf of Rockwood Insurance Company.

R. , p. 2.

On July 12,

1985, plaintiff Stalboerger accepted $48,000 in full settlement of
the claims he had for his own injuries and for the death of his
wife.

R. , p. 22.

It is this release that Mr. Stalboerger later

claimed was induced by fraud.

R., pp. 3 - 10.

The foregoing constitutes an overview of the facts which
formed the core of the claims in the case. Details are established
by reference to the record in connection with the arguments made
herein.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The Putter Club shows herein that this case should never have
gone to trial.

The primary reason is that the plaintiff, John

Stalboerger, had signed a general release which, despite his claims
had been induced by fraud, he later affirmed in writing in the
litigation.

The Putter Club claims that the release should be

interpreted to mean what it says and what it says is that anybody
that caused him legal injury is released.
10

The Putter Club next shows this court that the damages claimed
in the fraud action were the loss of Stalboerger's wrongful death
claim through fraud. When Stalboerger settled the fraud action, he
also settled the wrongful death claim in the related lawsuit by
operation of law. The district court should have found that there
were no damages left to award in the wrongful death action after
the fraud settlement. At a minimum, the district court should have
given a full credit for damages received in the fraud case against
the damages awarded in the wrongful death action because such
damages represent the same loss.
The Putter Club further shows that Stalboerger's election of
remedies to affirm the release and pursue his fraud remedies
constitutes a waiver of the wrongful death claim which the district
court should have dismissed.
Yet another reason this case should not have gone to trial is
that the court should have applied Utah's One Action Rule for
wrongful death cases.

Specifically, the first wrongful death

action filed by the children of the deceased was in a representative capacity of all heirs, including Mr. Stalboerger.
case

was

settled,

Stalboerger's

claim

was

also

When that

settled

and

Stalboerger should look to the other heirs of the deceased for his
share of the settlement.
Should this court determine that the district court correctly
allowed the case to move to trial, it is apparent that error was
made in allowing punitive damages. The Dram Shop Act in effect at

11

the time specifically defined what damages were available under the
Act,

Punitive damages are not an element of damage allowed.
Even if punitive damages were legally available, this is a

classic case of insufficient evidence to support the award.

The

Putter Club had net assets of $6,000 yet a grossly disproportionate
punitive damage award of $100,000 was allowed. This is contrary to
Utah case law setting the legal standard for the award of punitive
damages.
Substantial error also occurred when the district court
refused to allow The Putter Club to tell the jury that other
settlements had been made with the plaintiff and other heirs.
Utah's One Action Rule provides that there is one measure of
damages for the loss of a person and the failure to tell the jury
about the other settlements had the effect of distorting the jury
deliberation.
Finally, the district court erred in refusing to grant a
Motion for Mistrial when it allowed remarks of plaintiff's counsel
in closing argument to stand wherein he argued that the jury should
send a message to bar owners in Utah.

This argument appeals to

passion and prejudice and, under case law, was clearly improper.
PLEASE NOTE THAT ALL REFERENCES TO THE RECORD IN THIS BRIEF
ARE TO CASE NUMBER C86-494 UNLESS INDICATED OTHERWISE.

12

ARGUMENT
I.

PLAINTIFF RELEASED THE PUTTER CLUB
A.

Applicable Facts

As recited above, on July 12, 1985, plaintiff Stalboerger
executed a "Release of All Claims".

See Addendum "E".

This

release, in pertinent part, provided:
. . . Andrew John Stalboerger individually and
as heir of Marilyn Stalboerger do/does hereby
and for my/our/its heirs, executors, administrators, successors and assigns release,
acquit and forever discharge Joseph Turpin,
individually, and Redwood Industries, Inc., of
Salt Lake and his, her, their, or its agents,
servants, successors, heirs, executors, administrators and all other persons,
firms,
corporations,
associations
or partnerships
of and
from any and all claims, actions, causes of
action, demands, rights, damages, costs, loss
of services, expenses and compensation whatsoever, which the undersigned now has . . .
(Emphasis added)
This release is the subject of the original fraud lawsuit in which
plaintiff claimed he was fraudulently induced by insurance company
representatives to execute the release.

The district court later

required the plaintiff to elect whether he would proceed to collect
damages from the insurer for the fraud or whether he would seek
recision of the release and move forward on the wrongful death
claim. R. , pp. 354 - 357. The plaintiff elected to proceed on the
fraud claim.

R., pp. 511 - 513.

As a consequence of that

election, other defendants in the fraud case that might have been
liable only for wrongful death were immediately dismissed out of
the lawsuit.

R., pp. 585 - 586, 594 - 596.
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B.

Issue Presented

The Putter Club pled in its Answer that the release signed by
Stalboerger containing the general language also released The
Putter Club. R. , C87-2830, p. 80. The issue was formally presented to the court by a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment by The
Putter Club. R., pp. 1528, et seg. The district court ruled that
The Putter Club was not released under the general language of the
release.

R., p. 1572 - 1574.

The issue presented here is whether a general release is
enforceable by parties generally described in a release.
C.

Analysis

At common law, the release of one joint tort-feasor acted to
release all other joint tort-feasors.
Contribution

Among

Tort-Feasors

ameliorate this common law rule.

Utah adopted the Uniform

Act, found

in

§78-27-42, to

Krukiewicz v. Draper, 725 P.2d

1349 (Utah 1986).
The statute in effect at the time Stalboerger executed the
release read as follows:
78-27-42. A release by the injured person of
one joint tort-feasor, whether before or after
judgment, does not discharge the other tortfeasors, unless
the release
so provides,
but
reduces the claim against the other tortfeasors by the greater of: (1) The amount of
the consideration paid for that release; or
(2) the amount or proportion by which the
release provides that the total claim shall be
reduced. (Emphasis added)
Unfortunately, while

the Uniform

Act

has

received

wide

acceptance by a majority of the states, the language "unless the
14

release so provides" has been subject to three approaches of
interpretation.

As explained in Moore v. Missouri Pac. R.R.f 773

S.W.2d 78 (Ark. 1989), the three approaches are generally labeled
as the "flat bar" rule, the "intent" rule, and the "specific
identity" rule.
Briefly, the flat bar rule is that the release does what it
says.

That is, when a release purports to release "all" it means

"all".

Our own federal Tenth Circuit has adopted this approach as

has our neighboring state of New Mexico.

See, Mussett v. Baker

Material Handling Corp.f 844 F.2d 760 (10th Cir. 1988); Johnson v.
City of Las Cruces. 521 P.2d 1037 (N.M. App. 1974).
Under the intent rule, some courts have taken the approach
that the broad language of a general release is applicable to
unnamed tort-feasors only if evidence is presented that the parties
to the release so intended.
The specific identity rule interprets the statutory language
to mean that the release of one tort-feasor does not discharge
others unless they are specifically named in the release or
otherwise specifically identifiable from the face of the release.
A review of the case law will show that this is the minority
approach with a likely plurality of the flat bar rule among the
jurisdictions considering the question.
With Stalboerger having affirmed the release so that he could
move forward against the insurance company on his fraud claim, the
issue for this court of first impression is whether the general
release executed includes in its broad language The Putter Club.
15

An examination of the law and facts shows that this state ought to
adopt the flat bar rule. In fact, as shown below, it appears that
Utah has essentially adopted the rule already.
First, rules of statutory interpretation dictate application
of the release to The Putter Club. Courts are to assume that each
term in a statute was used advisedly and that the statutory
language should be read literally unless the language is unreasonably confused or inoperable. Savage Indus.. Inc. v. Utah State
Tax Comm'n, 811 P.2d 664 (Utah 1991); Cox Rock Prod, v. Walker
Pipeline Constr., 754 P.2d 672 (Utah App. 1988).

Statutes are not

to be construed as effecting change in the common law beyond that
which is clearly indicated keeping in mind the remedial application
intended.

Home v. Home, 737 P. 2d 244 (Utah App. 1987).

If one looks at the language of §78-27-42 in light of these
rules of statutory construction, what emerges is that the legislature intended to reverse the common law rule that the release of
one

joint tort-feasor automatically

releases all others, but

allowed releasors to release other tort-feasors.

Construction

towards finding intent or specificity under the other approaches is
inconsistent with the rules of statutory construction because those
approaches go further than the literal language of the statute
which is not confused or unreasonable on its face.
A second reason that the literal language of the release
applies to The Putter Club is that the construction proposed is
consistent with the rules of contract interpretation. A release is
a contract subject to the same general rules of interpretation as
16

other contracts. Horgan v. Indus. Design Corp., 657 P.2d 751 (Utah
1982).

A contract in Utah is given the meaning which its ordinary

language suggests determined

by reading the contract

in its

entirety and giving effect to all parts so far as that is possible.
Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Salt Lake City, 740 P.2d 1357
(Utah App. 1987).

Utah law further holds that it is not the role

of courts in contractual disputes to relieve a party of an
improvident or bad bargain if the language is sufficiently clear,
including language of releases. Horgan,

id.

The release at issue does not contain technical or vague
language.
"all".

The plain language of this release is that it releases

This plain language was affirmed by the plaintiff and

explains why, in the fraud case, the other defendants who had no
role in the fraud but were potential wrongful death defendants
(Turpin and his employer, Redwood Industries) were released by the
court from the lawsuit.

With the release affirmed, there was no

longer a wrongful death claim against them.

All means all. That

it may have been a bad bargain in hindsight is not the standard for
interpreting the release. Plaintiff obviously had legal counsel at
the time the release language was affirmed and is without legal
justification to avoid the rules of construction of the release.
Yet another reason for adopting a flat bar rule is that Utah
case law has, essentially, already adopted the rule through at
least one case decided by this court. In Palmer v. Davis, 808 P.2d
128 (Utah App. 1991), an injured party executed a release which
released a tort-feasor and employees of the tort-feasor.
17

The

injured party then sought to bring an action against an employee of
the released party for the same injury.

This court held that use

of the term "employee" was sufficient to release the defendant
employee.

This court correctly applied the rules of construction

discussed above to apply the plain language of the release and hold
that the language releasing persons falling within the word
"employee" does just that.
Similarly, The Putter Club falls within the general language
of "all other persons, firms, and corporations which might have
contributed" to the claims made by the plaintiff. One reading the
release has no more difficulty in understanding the Stalboerger
release than the release signed by Palmer referring to employees.
In addition to the reasons given above to enforce the release,
there are some public policy reasons for applying the release to
The Putter Club. One is that a defendant entering a release has no
certainty of being absolved from liability if the plaintiff cannot
generally release all potential tort-feasors.

As in the Palmer

case and as in the three cases which were at issue here, plaintiff
may fragment litigation with scattered lawsuits raising the spectre
of indemnification and of contribution claims against the released
tort-feasors. Defendants need to know that they are out of risk of
further liability or a chill is put on the settlement process.
See, Morison v. General Motors Corp. , 428 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1970).
This court should apply the plain language of the affirmed
release and reverse the trial court by vacating the judgment
because The Putter Club was released.
18

II. STALBOERGER WAIVED HIS CLAIM AGAINST
THE PUTTER CLUB BY HIS ELECTION OF REMEDIES
A.

Applicable Facts

By Order, dated July 6, 1988, the court ordered the plaintiff
in the fraud case to elect whether he would affirm the release and
move forward with the fraud claim or whether he would seek recision
of the release and move forward with the wrongful death claims.
R., p. 354.

See, Addendum "H".

Plaintiff filed a Notice of

Election on September 30, 1988, in which he indicated he was
affirming that he would proceed with the fraud claim. R., p. 511.
See, Addendum "I".

The natural byproduct of affirming the release

was to let those against whom a wrongful death claim, but not a
fraud claim, was asserted out of the lawsuit. Joe Turpin, and his
employer, Redwood Industries, Inc., were dismissed as defendants.
R., pp. 585 - 586, 594 - 596.
The Putter Club, recognizing that it was included in the
encompassing language of the release also sought dismissal because
of the election of remedies.
Motion without explanation.
B.

R. , p. 1535.

The court denied the

R., pp. 1572 and 1580.

Issue Presented

At issue is whether Stalboerger waived his wrongful death
claim against The Putter Club by affirming the release of July 15,
1985.
C.

Analysis

This Brief established earlier that a release is a contract
subject to the rules generally governing contracts. A fundamental
19

principle of contract law is that one defrauded in the inducement
to enter the contract has three remedies.

The injured party may

either affirm the transaction and seek damages for the fraud, may
rescind the fraudulent transaction, or may seek enforcement of the
actual deal made.

12 Williston, Treatise on the Law of Contracts

§1523 (3rd ed.).

This election must be made within a reasonable

time after discovery of the fraud.
Another

basic

principle

of

Williston, §1523.
contract

law

is that

after

affirmation of the transaction with knowledge of the fraud the
injured party loses the power to avoid the contract.

Restatement

(Second) of Contracts §380.
Utah has long followed this rule of election.

In Viallet v.

Consolidated Ry. and Power Co., 30 Utah 260, 84 P. 496 (1906), the
court considered a similar case in which an injured party sought to
avoid a release which he claimed was induced by misrepresentation.
The court freely recognized that the plaintiff could avoid a
release and proceed to recover for the insufficient settlement
entered by the fraudulent inducement.
In Midvale Motorsf Inc. v. Saunders, 19 Utah 2d. 403, 432 P.2d
37 (1967), the Utah Supreme Court considered whether a real estate
vendor could pursue alternative inconsistent remedies.

The court

held that the defendants had a right during the course of litigation to demand the vendor make an election between the inconsistent
remedies sought.

The requirement to make an election in fraud

cases has been clearly stated in Mecham v. Benson, 590 P.2d 304
(Utah 1979). See, also, Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1980).
20

The Utah rule was clearly stated in Cook v. Covey-Ballard
Motor Co. . 69 Utah 161, 253 P. 196 (1927).

There a buyer sought to

recover damages incurred because of fraud in the sale of an
automobile.

The court made clear that the buyer can affirm the

contract and sue for damages or can seek to rescind the contract
and seek other damages. The two positions are, however, inconsistent and an election is required.
Other states have recognized that an injured party must elect
between
release.

fraud remedies when fraudulently

induced to enter a

For example in Mackley v. Allstate Ins. Co.P 564 S.W.2d

634 (Mo. App. 1978), the court held that an injured party must
elect to proceed either on the personal injury claim or affirm the
release and proceed on fraud.

Cf, Richardson v. Economy Fire &

Casualty Co., 485 N.E.2d 327 (111. 1985).
Put in the context of this case, what happened conceptually is
that

Stalboerger

sued

Rockwood

Insurance

claiming

that

the

misrepresentations of its agents caused him to accept less than the
full value of his claim and generally loose his wrongful death
claims.

Stalboerger was, in effect, telling the court that he had

been defrauded by Rockwood of The Putter Club claim by entering the
release.

By electing to affirm the release, Stalboerger was

seeking to recover from Rockwood Insurance Company the value of
that which he lost and had waived the alternative remedy of moving
forward on the wrongful death claims.

The Third District Court

erred by letting him have both approaches.

That is, Stalboerger

affirmed

claims,

the

release

that

releases
21

all

Stalboerger

collected $168,000 in settlement, and then was allowed to recover
from The Putter Club that which he had claimed he lost and settled
in the fraud case. This approach is clearly wrong, grants a double
recovery, and ignores the fundamental law of election of remedies
in fraud cases.
This court should hold that the wrongful death claim against
The Putter Club was waived by the election of remedies in which
Stalboerger ratified the release and reverse the judgment of the
trial court.
III. SPECIAL AND GENERAL DAMAGES AWARDED SHOULD HAVE BEEN
ELIMINATED OR SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCED BY AN APPROPRIATE OFFSET
A.

Applicable Facts

Plaintiff's original lawsuit was Stalboerger v. Rockwood Ins.
Co. , et al. , Case No. C86-494. As explained earlier in this Brief,
the Complaint was amended and ultimately ended up with the insurer
of the tort-feasor, insurance adjusting firms, and an insurance
adjuster as defendants. Put at its most basic, Stalboerger claimed
that he was fraudulently induced to enter the release of July 12,
1985 by agents of Rockwood Insurance Company.
A reading of the Complaint shows that the plaintiff correctly
understood that the measure of damages for his Complaint was the
loss of his claim for the wrongful death of his wife in executing
the release. This approach is consistent with the earlier original
and subsequent Amended Complaints.
Addendum "J".

R. , pp. 927 - 939.

See,

For example, allegation number 19 of the operative

Amended Complaint states:
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19*
Plaintiff is entitled to recover from
Rockwood a n amount equaling t h e full value of
his claims arising from t h e aforesaid a u t o m o bile accident based o n t h e facts known a t t h e
time of t h e purported settlement.
Plaintiff
is also entitled t o recover interest [and
other d a m a g e s ] .
Plaint i f f ::: omp 1 a i i it s

QTT^i

-»-V^,

.lowing:
21.
Prior wo plaintiff's signing I,I c n e
purported r e l e a s e , defendants
represented t o plaintiff that t h e amount of t h e
purported settlement represented t h e fair
value of plaintiff's cl a i m s .
Again

- -. allegata on number
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1,
I n a n amount representing t h e full value
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his o w n personal injuries, and/or t h e amount
plaintiff could have realized from
such
claims.
Plaintiff filed

t i o n s found

fci

show, MIHI

% P<JJ ticularized Statement

•

*

-ecord

Allegatatement

. . . , *u. claiming that r.t< w a s tricked by a n

insurance adjuster into giving u p

value

i v'air
.„:

t h e wrongful death of I
Addendum ' " 1 : '
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The gate to reversible error was opened when plaintiff was
allowed by the district court to act inconsistent conceptually with
what he claimed.

Specifically, plaintiff filed in the fraud case

a Motion for Approval of Settlement. R. , p. 1482. This Motion had
attached to it a settlement agreement to resolve the case with the
fraud defendants.

The Settlement Agreement is reproduced in

Addendum "L". This document completely ignored the claims made and
was phrased in a self-serving manner which, unfortunately, was
affirmed by the district court.

See, Addendum "M".

An examination of the settlement agreement, at R. , p. 1486,
shows that the parties stipulated that the $48,000 settlement paid
at the time of the original release was to be allocated $32,100 for
the wrongful death claim, $15,000 for Stalboerger's personal injury
claims, and $900 for property damage.

Stalboerger obviously

realized that in affirming the release he released The Putter Club.
A self-serving paragraph was inserted whereby it was stated that
there was no intent to release other parties and the Agreement went
on to try and show the settlement of a fraud claim was not for the
damages alleged in the claim.
agreed

to

pay

another

Finally, the Rockwood and Summers

$120,000

to

Stalboerger

under mutual

agreement that this was not payment for the fraud claims.

The

fraud claim was, however, dismissed by the court pursuant to this
Motion.

R. , p. 1576.

The court also struck the defense of The

Putter Club that it was released by the July 12, 1985 release.
The Putter Club responded to this gross distortion of the
legal concepts at work in the litigation by filing a Motion for
24

i set-off of the settlement but was
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plaintiff may elect one of several remedies to proceed.

Again, as

in this case, the plaintiff ratified the release and proceeded with
his action in fraud.

The court found that the correct measure of

damages is that which places the injured party in the same position
that he would have occupied had he not been defrauded.
In Richardson v. Economy Fire & Casualty Co. r 485 N.E.2d 327
(111. 1985), the court considered the claim of an injured party in
a motorcycle accident against an insurance company for allegedly
being induced to sign a release for less than the full value of the
claim.

The court noted the importance of the plaintiff affirming

the release and held that the proper measure of damages is the
difference between what the plaintiff received under the release
and the "probable amount" that would have been received absent a
fraud.
Though Utah has no recent case law concerning

fraud with

respect to a personal injury case, the conclusion of the courts
identified above is consistent with Utah case law.

That is, the

correct measure of damage in a fraud case is the actual amount of
the loss caused by the fraud, plus other damages which naturally
flow from the fraudulent activity.
(Utah 1980).

Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239

Cf. , Viallet v. Consolidated Ry. and Power Co., 30

Utah 260, 84 P. 496 (1906).
In this case, assuming that fraud occurred, what Stalboerger
lost was the difference between what he might have received in
settlement absent fraud and what he actually received.

Conse-

quently, when he settled the fraud case for $120,000, his settle26
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1

For example, assume that a wrongful death has occurred.
Assume further that the value of the wrongful death is $100,000.
"A" and "B" are the sole heirs of the deceased.

As explained in

detail hereinafter, there is one claim for the wrongful death of
the decedent.

If the value of the wrongful death is apportioned

according to Utah's laws of intestacy, "A" and "B" should each
receive $50,000. However, if "A" settled for $1,000 for reasons of
his own, "B" is not automatically entitled to $99,000. Rather, "B"
would receive $50,000 and the defendants would receive a credit for
$49,000.

To hold otherwise would guarantee that a wrongful death

defendant would never settle with an heir.

Liability exposure

would not be reduced by settlement unless all heirs settled at
once.
Stalboerger falls squarely within the illustration above.
Stalboerger claims that he was defrauded of the full value of the
claim for the wrongful death of his wife.

Because the One-Action

Rule sets a single measure of damages for the deceased, Stalboerger
had some percentage of the total measure of damages which he lost.
When he settled his fraud claim, the amount of money he received is
the least amount which would be applied as a credit.

The actual

credit is the full value of the settled claim against the full
value of the wrongful death.

That is, when he settled the fraud

claim, he settled by implication his damages under the wrongful
death claim.
For Stalboerger to prevail, this court must create new law
explaining

away the One-Action Rule and explaining
28
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R. , C86-0985, pp. 57 - 62. This move is significant because in the
supporting Memorandum, Scurlock explained to the court that he
realized he was acting for all heirs of Marilyn Stalboerger.

R.,

C86-0985, at p. 64.
The children of Marilyn Stalboerger later entered a release of
All Claims specifically

identifying The Putter Club.

These

releases are found in the record to C86-494 at pp. 384 - 391 and
are reproduced in the Addendum.
The district court, obviously recognizing the issues created
by the one-action rule, then issued an Order to Show Cause to all
other heirs as to why the case should not be dismissed because of
the settlement of the children.

The Certificate of Service shows

the Order was mailed to counsel for Mr. Stalboerger. R. , C86-0985,
pp. 143 - 145.

Stalboerger never responded to the Order to Show

Cause and the case was, as explained earlier in this Brief, sort of
dismissed and sort of left open.
B.

Nature of Wrongful Death Actions in Utah

The error of the district court in this case apparently arises
from a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of a wrongful
death action in Utah.
of the Utah Code.

The obvious beginning analysis is §78-11-7

The intent of this section is to overcome old

common law rules blocking recovery for death and create a cause of
action in the surviving heirs. Webb v. Denver & R.G.W.Ry.. 7 Utah
17, 24 P. 616 (1890).

This statute makes clear that the personal

representative or any heir may bring the action for wrongful death
for the benefit of all heirs.
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in t h i s

Drief

that

there is under Utah law only a single wrongful death action which
can be brought either by the personal representative or by an heir,
but not both because one or the other acts for all heirs.
The operation of the one action rule is, unfortunately, not
widely addressed in case law.

There are some cases from other

states which follow analysis consistent with that stated herein.
For example, in Mayerhoff v. Kaiser Found. Health Planr Inc., 71
Cal. App. 3d 803, 138 Cal. Rptr. 319 (1977), the court considered
a dispute between parents of a deceased seeking to bring a wrongful
death action after the decedent's husband and son had settled a
prior suit brought for the same wrongful death.

All of these

persons were heirs under California's wrongful death statute. The
court held the statute contemplated only one action for wrongful
death. The parents, the court said, had an equal right to bring an
action and had a responsibility to join their action with knowledge
that the other heirs had filed suit. The claim of the parents was,
consequently, barred.
The same result was obtained in Mitchell v. Mitchell, 655 P. 2d
748 (Alaska 1982).

It was held there that a release executed by a

personal representative pursuant to a wrongful death action barred
the subsequent claim by a son of the deceased under a statute that
anticipated one action being brought for all of the heirs.

The

personal representative in that case admittedly entered the release
under the understanding that it would not be binding on the son,
but the court held that the mistaken belief was not relevant under
an one action rule.
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to the record, Stalboerger, for reasons not in the record, chose
not to pursue his wrongful death claim in the Scurlock case. One
can surmise with almost certain accuracy that the reason was that
he always intended to pursue the fraud claim and elect to recover
for his losses in fraud rather than in a wrongful death action.
This is reinforced by Stalboerger's disinterest in serving The
Putter Club with the Complaint as explained earlier.
Under the case law stated above, when the Scurlocks executed
the release, The Putter Club was released for all heirs.

The

failure of Stalboerger to protect his rights under the one action
rule is an apparent tactical choice to which he should be held.
The requirement that The Putter Club face a series of lawsuits by
multiple heirs is exactly the problem which the one action rule was
adopted to prevent. To hold otherwise would be to create judicially a requirement that potential defendants in wrongful death cases
conduct genealogical research to make sure all of the heirs have
been located and are satisfied with the settlement even though the
wrongful death statute says that the plaintiff with whom the
defendant is negotiating acts for all heirs.
The Putter Club raised the one action rule problem in a timely
Motion for Summary Judgment in case no. C87-2830.

R. , C87-2830,

pp. Ill - 122. The court denied the Motion. R. , C87-2830, pp. 252
- 254. The Putter Club raised the issue again after consolidation
of the cases.

R. , pp. 1528 - 1565.

The failure of the district

court to apply the one action rule was error.
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language of the dram shop statute.

Put another way, the scope of

the cause of action is determined by reading carefully the Dram
Shop Act.

This approach was followed in Brinkerhoff v. Forsythf

779 P.2d 685 (Utah 1989).

There at issue was the scope of an

exemption for bartenders employed by the State of Utah.

The Utah

Supreme Court again followed the literal language of the Dram Shop
Act in order to determine the scope of its application. See,

also,

Allisen v. American Legion Post No. 134 f 763 P.2d 806, (Utah 1988).
The Dram Shop Act at issue in this litigation has been amended
since this accident occurred.

The damages provided in the act in

effect at the time of the accident provides that those who sell
intoxicating liquor to others are " . . . liable for injuries in
person, property, or means of support. . .".

See, §37-11-1 in

Addendum.
C.

Analysis

In Biswell v. Duncan, 742 P.2d 80 (Utah App. 1987), this court
held that punitive damages were available against drunk drivers
under appropriate circumstances.

A review of the Utah case law

shows, however, that there has not been a determination of whether
punitive damages may be applied to a dram shop under the Dram Shop
Act.
If one applies the law described above to the effect that dram
shop actions are a creature of statute and that one derives rights
from the plain language of the statute, it is seen that punitive
damages are not available in Utah for dram shop actions. The most
fundamental rule of statutory interpretation is to apply its plain
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the jury.

First, the policy of the state is to construe away from

punitive damages.

Second, the cause of action arising under the

Dram Shop Act is limited by the actual language of the Act because
dram shop actions are a creature of statute.

Finally, a reading of

§37-11-1 shows that only injuries to the person, property, and for
loss of support are available under the plain language of the
statute.

This court should reverse the trial court and vacate the

award of punitive damages.
VI. THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT
BOTH THE AWARD AND THE AMOUNT OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
A.

Applicable Facts

Objection was made by The Putter Club to consideration by the
jury of an award of punitive damages.

R., pp. 3433 - 3435.

After

trial, objection was made again in the form of a Motion for New
Trial or, in the Alternative, for Remittitur of the punitive damage
amounts.

R., p. 1991.

The jury was allowed by the district court

to consider punitive damages and awarded $100,000.
B.

Applicable Law

If this court should hold that punitive damages were legally
available in spite of the argument raised in the foregoing section,
the next relevant question becomes whether under the allowable
standards the damages were available in this case and, if so,
whether the amount awarded was within the amounts allowed by law.
In claiming insufficient evidence, appellant has the duty to
marshal1 all of the facts in support of the verdict and show this
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court why those facts are insufficient. Anton v. Thomas, 806 P.2d
744 (Utah App. 1991) .
The Utah Supreme Court in Johnson v. Rogers. 763 P. 2d 771
(Utah 1988), provided that punitive damages may be imposed for
conduct that is willful and malicious or that manifests a knowing
and reckless indifference and disregard toward the rights of
others. Citing with approval Biswell, supra,

the court agreed that

punitive damages are intended to address wrongful acts which are
above and beyond the basic elements of the cause of action.

As

explained in Biswell, the mere fact that one is a drunken driver
that causes injury is not sufficient to impose punitive damages.
Instead, the trier of fact must find some aggravating circumstances
arising above the basic elements of the cause of action.
Johnson was primarily concerned with assessing liability
against the employer of a drunk driver. The standard for reaching
the employer for the acts of the employee were discussed exhaustively.

The Utah Supreme Court adopted the approach of the

Restatement (Second) of Torts §909 and the Restatement (Second) of
Agency §217C.

The elements which the court set out were as

follows:
1.

The employer authorized the doing and
manner of the act.

2.

The agent was unfit and the owner was
reckless in employing him.

3.

The agent was employed in a managerial
capacity and was acting in the scope of
employment.

4.

The employer ratified or approved the
act.
39

The holding of Johnson was that if at least one of these
factors are not present, punitive damages cannot be assessed
against the employer•
The other major body of law for consideration is factors to be
considered by a jury in justifying the amount of punitive damages.
Utah has identified the following factors for consideration by the
jury:
1.

The relative wealth of the defendant.

2.

The nature of the alleged misconduct.

3.

The facts and circumstances of the misconduct and the effect upon the lives of
the plaintiff.

4.

The probability of future recurrences of
the misconduct.

5.

The relationship between the parties.

6.

The amount of actual damages awarded.

These elements, set out in Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766
(Utah 1985) and Bundy v. Century Equip. Co.r Inc., 692 P. 2d 754
(Utah 1984), show that when any of these elements are out of
balance that the size of the punitive damage award is called into
question.
C.

Analysis

The facts supporting an award of punitive damages beyond the
mere elements of the cause of action are scant.

However, in an

effort to marshall supporting facts, it can be said that the jury
found that Mr. Turpin became intoxicated at The Putter Club and,
consequently, caused the death of Mrs. Stalboerger.
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The primary

presentation of facts concerning punitive damages occurred through
the testimony of the club manager only.

In the transcript at page

3076, the manager explains that there was not a program in effect
to follow the number of drinks by cash customers.

He also

testified that the club policy was to stop serving drinks when
someone appeared intoxicated.

R., p. 3079.

One searches the record in vain to find meaningful facts
supporting the award of punitive damages against The Putter Club
under the Johnson case.

Specifically, there is no evidence that

the management of The Putter Club authorized the bartender to serve
alcohol to Mr. Turpin while he was intoxicated.

In fact, Mr.

Gilbert testified that he was not present at the time of the
alleged incident and that all employees had been informed not to
serve persons who were intoxicated.

R., p. 3304, et seg.

Next, no evidence exists in the record that the bartender was
unfit in any way.
Third, there is no evidence that the bartender, Dee Marsing,
was employed in a managerial capacity of any kind.
identified at the trial only as a bartender.

She was

R., p. 3002.

Finally, there is no evidence in the record that a manager in
any way ratified or approved what transpired.

There was no

evidence that the bartender even knew Turpin was driving.
In summary, The Putter Club made a timely objection at trial
that under Johnson there was absolutely no evidence available for
the jury to make consideration of punitive damages against The
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Putter Club.

There was no showing of malice nor of any facts

beyond the basic elements of the claim as required by Johnson
Should the plaintiff be successful in overcoming this hurdle
of the availability of punitive damages under Johnson, it is seen
that there was insufficient evidence to support an award of
$100,000. The evidence presented at trial in support of the amount
of punitive damages commences on page 3515 of the record and
consists solely of the testimony of Mr. Gilbert plus some financial
statements he provided.

If one marshals the facts and applies the

standards recited above, it is seen that an award of $100,000 is
grossly disproportionate to that allowed by law.
Looking first at the evidence in support of the award, one
cannot deny that the element of the effect on the lives of the
parties is present.

Mr. Stalboerger lost his wife and suffered

tragic circumstances for which he was compensated in the original
settlement and again by the jury.

Also, a finding of service of

liquor to one intoxicated is of concern when considering the nature
of the alleged misconduct.

Other supporting facts simply do not

exist.
The elements which fail to support the award are several.
First, there is no evidence in the record of any likelihood of
recurrence of the event. No evidence was presented that dram shop
liability happened before this incident and, while evidence was
presented that the club corporation continues in existence six
years after the automobile accident, no subsequent incidents were
identified.

R., p. 3517.
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Next, the plaintiff fails in presentation of evidence on the
relative wealth of the defendant. The only evidence in support of
the relative wealth of the defendant was trial exhibit numbers 36
and 37, which consisted of operating statements of the club showing
a million dollar revenue stream.

As counsel for The Putter Club

argued at trial, this revenue stream is misleading to a lay jury
and does not constitute significant evidence of wealth.

In fact,

counsel for the plaintiff really asked the jury to speculate in his
argument concerning these revenue statements by telling the jury
that where one million dollars goes through a club that somebody
must be making a lot of money.

R., pp. 3535 - 3536.

Contrary to the operating statements and contrary to the
invitation to speculate by counsel for the plaintiff, the evidence
showed that the club was not wealthy and could not afford a
$100,000 punitive damage award. First, The Putter Club was a nonprofit organization organized under Utah law prohibiting the taking
of a profit from the club.

See, Gilbert testimony, pp. 3517 -

3518. Gilbert also testified that during the last couple of years
before the trial that the club was in a loss position.
3526.

R. , p.

Gilbert further testified that the loss was of sufficient

severity that he did not take a draw for salary for two years. R. ,
p. 3527.

Finally, Gilbert testified that the effect of the

compensatory damage award would be to put the corporation out of
business because the total assets of the corporation were only
about $6,000 against a compensatory damage award of $487,000. R.,
pp. 3528, 3532.
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In summary, a $100,000 damage award was entered against a
corporation not allowed to make a profit by law, that was in a loss
position, that had net assets of $6,000 to $7,000 and would be
forced out of business by the compensatory damage award.

These

elements are clearly contrary to the standards for determining the
size of an award in punitive damages. The $100,000 was clearly an
emotional reaction to the tragic death caused by a drunk driver
rather than tied to any reasonable element measuring damages. The
district court erred in not eliminating or remitting the punitive
damage award to an amount under, perhaps, half of the net assets of
$6,000.
Assuming the plaintiff overcomes all of the substantial legal
difficulty

given above

and punitive damages

are held to be

available, the damage award should be reduced by remittitur for
further proceedings to be put in line with the applicable legal
doctrine and the facts of the financial circumstances of the club
corporation.
VII. THE JURY SHOULD HAVE BEEN
INFORMED ABOUT OTHER SETTLEMENTS
A.
As has

been

discussed

Facts
in considerable

detail

above

in

connection with the release issues, plaintiff Stalboerger received
settlements of $168,000 from other defendants prior to trial while
the Scurlock children received $37,500 total.

The Putter Club

asked the court to advise the jury of the related settlements. R. ,
p. 1617.

These settlements would include the settlement of the
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Scurlock children because of the unitary measure of damages under
the One Action Rule.

The court denied the request.

R., p. 1713.

At trial, jury instruction 19A, R. , p. 1955, instructed the
jury that they should consider the value of the decedent to all of
her heirs.

See, Addendum "N".

This instruction was an obvious

attempt to comply with the One Action Rule discussed above.

The

defense counsel objected repeatedly to the presentation of evidence
of damage not balanced out by informing the jury that substantial
sums of money had already been obtained by the heirs. R., pp. 3100
- 3102, 346, 2824 - 2825, 2859 - 2860.

These continued objections

combined with the a number of references to other litigation led to
the court advising the jury that there had been other litigation
and

settlement, but not telling

settlement.

the

jury the amount of

that

R., pp. 3373 - 3374.
B.

Applicable law

In Slusher v. Ospital r 777 P.2d 437 (Utah 1989), the Utah
Supreme Court considered a tort action in which multiple defendants
had entered a settlement agreement and a remaining defendant went
to trial.

The court stated:
Where an injured plaintiff and one or more,
but not all, defendant tort-feasors enter into
a settlement agreement, the parties must
promptly inform the court and the other parties to the action of the existence of the
agreement and of its terms. Where the
action

is tried by a jury,
the court shall,
upon
motion of a party, disclose
the existence and
basic content of the agreement to the
jury
unless
the jury finds
that,
on the
facts
particular
to the case, such disclosure
will
create substantial
danger of undue
prejudice,
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of confusing
jury.

the issues,

or of misleading

the

(Emphasis added).

A reading of Slusher shows that the rationale of the court was
that juries ought to be fully informed of what is occurring in the
case so that the decision rendered might be truly reflective of
both the legal and factual setting of the case. As is shown below,
the failure to follow this rule worked real prejudice against The
Putter Club.
C.

Analysis

The order of the court to not discuss settlement amounts at
trial works prejudice against The Putter Club. The advising of the
jury that there was a settlement and then not allowing the jury be
told the amount of the settlement is directly contrary to the
operation of the One Action Rule.

The jury was not allowed to

determine total loss of the heirs, fix Stalboerger's share of that
loss, and give credit for all the settlements to reach a final
figure.
In short, the half-way approach of the district court to tell
the jury that there were settlements but not tell them the full
amount was directly contrary to the policies expressed in Slusher.
That is, the jury could not consider and determine the full measure
of damages for this wrongful
insufficient information.

death

action because they had

This court should reverse the damage

award and remand the case for a determination of the correct amount
of damages by a jury that is fully informed of all of the available
information.
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VIII.

REMARKS OF PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL IN REBUTTAL
MERIT REVERSAL OF THE DAMAGE AWARD
A.

Facts

The jury was first allowed to retire and deliberate concerning
special and general damages and then a separate proceeding was held
to consider punitive damages.

Before the first jury deliberation

in the rebuttal portion of the closing argument of the plaintiff,
counsel stated as follows, as found at R., p. 3503:
I would like to point out to you that this is
probably also your one time to be heard. I
doubt you will ever be in this position again.
It's your one time to make a difference in how
many drunks bars put on the highways of this
state. By the decisions that you make here,
you will send a message — several messages in
this community. If you rule in favor of The
Putter Club in this case, you will send a
message not only to The Putter Club, but all
other servers of alcohol in this state that
what they did was okay. It's okay to trade
thirty bucks for a woman's life.
If you rule against The Putter Club, you will
send a message that if you want that thirty
dollars, you are going to have to answer for
this. The amount of damages that you award in
this case also will be an expression of some
more messages, that human life is important,
that it doesn't matter how many bad things you
can come up with, that you can't take a basically good person [and do injury.] . . .
Immediately upon completion of that argument, counsel for the
defense moved for a mistrial. Defendant then moved for a new trial
under Rule 59 because of the highly inflammatory prejudicial nature
of this statement.

R., p. 1982 and 3509.
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B.

Analysis

In considering a Motion for New Trial for attorney misconduct,
the trial judge has broad latitude and will not be overturned on
appeal absent an abuse of discretion. Nelson v. Trujillof 657 P. 2d
730 (Utah 1982).

There is a presumption that the trial court

properly exercised its discretion unless the record clearly shows
otherwise.

Goddard v. Hickman, 685 P.2d 530 (Utah 1984).

A similar situation was considered in Donohue v. Intermountain
Health Care. Inc.. 748 P.2d 1067 (Utah 1987).

In that medical

malpractice proceeding, plaintiff's counsel argued to the jury what
the court characterized as "clearly improper" arguments which
attempted to appeal to the social or economic prejudices of the
jury.

Counsel asked them to consider their responsibility of

evaluating an individual against the "strong and the mighty" of
society.

The court denounced counsel's remarks motivated to stir

up the jury emotionally and designed to elicit sympathy or inspire
passion or prejudice which should not be allowed. See, also,

Eager

V. Willis. 410 P.2d 1003 (Utah 1966).
As stated in Maercks v. Birchansky, 549 So.2d 199 (Fla. App.
1989), the "send a message" argument has the effect of injecting
punitive damages into a case where they would not otherwise be
allowed.

See, also,

Fisher v. Mcllroy, 739 S.W.2d 577 (Mo. App.

1987) and Halftown v. Triple D Leasing Corp., 453 N.Y.S.2d 514
(1982).

The "send a message" comments of plaintiff's counsel in

this case is particularly prejudicial because of the two phases of
the damage hearing. What plaintiff's counsel did was introduce and
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invite the jury to award punitive damages in the compensatory
portion of the case and then invite the jury again in the punitive
damage deliberations to again punish the defendant.
As with Donohue, this court should hold that the district
court clearly abused its discretion

in allowing the "send a

message" argument to stand. Timely objection was made immediately
after the statement at a time when the court could have instructed
the jury again of the appropriate measure of damages or otherwise
eliminate the prejudicial nature of the statements. The statements
inviting passion and prejudice are no more proper in this case than
under the facts recited in Donohue. This court should reverse the
judgment and remand it for a new hearing on damages.
CONCLUSION
This Brief has shown the court that the claims against The
Putter Club were defective from the very beginning.

Tactical

decisions by plaintiff's counsel combined with multiple judges on
interrelated claims has resulted in the very evils which the legal
doctrines examined above were intended to avoid.

The Putter Club

found itself exposed to multiple lawsuits in violation of the One
Action Rule and contrary to the plain language of a release by the
plaintiff. Plaintiff was allowed to ignore the nature of his fraud
lawsuit so as to achieve a double recovery through the multiple
cases.

The defendants were not allowed a full and fair hearing

when they were gagged with respect to advising the jury of the
multiple settlements that had occurred and when they became the
victim of a plea to passion and prejudice.
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The Putter Club suffered a wrong verdict not only because of
pleas to passion and prejudice, but also because the court allowed
the award of punitive damages in a case in which they are not
legally available. Even if one was to assume punitive damages are
legally available, the award made was disproportionate to the
evidence presented of the relative wealth of the defendant.
The Putter Club is aware that the multiple issues presented
could result in a variety of resolutions by this court.

A matrix

showing the legal effect of applying the legal doctrines discussed
in this Brief is included in the Addendum to aid the court in its
evaluation.
The court is requested to reverse the judgment.
DATED this

/!**

day of November, 1992.
KIPP & CHRISTIAN, P.C.

G R E G O R Y ^
MICHAEL F. SKOLNICK, ESQ.
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
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